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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff /Respondent 
vs. 
DENNIS A. HEAPS, Case No. 19254 
Defendant/Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Dennis A. Heaps, appeals from the judgment 
and conviction by the Court sitting without a jury in the 
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge, . 
presiding, of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted 
Person, a Felony in the Second Degree. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted on April 25, 1983 and was 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term 
of one to fifteen years, concurrent. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction of Possession 
of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a Second Degree 
Felony, in the Court below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
on January 25, 1983, Salt Lake City police office1· 
Henry Huish stopped a truck and, at gunpoint, required all of 
the occupants to exit the vehicle with their hands raised; then 
he handcuffed all the occupants immediately (Tr.37,46,58,68,84, 
85), but did not tell them they were under arrest, although he 
told them they were subject to arrest (Tr.67,68,70). Officer 
Huish then searched the vehicle and found a firearm under the 
passenger side of the truck's bench seat, approximately 12 to 18 
inches from the passenger side door (Tr.59,60). 
Officer Huish subsequently questioned each of the occupant' 
about who the gun belonged to, how it got there, and what it 
was doing ~here (Tr.62). He talked first to David McCoy, the 
owner and driver of the truck; he spoke with Mike Perry second, 
with a juvenile girl third, and with appellant last (Tr.62). 
David McCoy was the only witness who testified that the 
gun was in appellant's possession (Tr.35,45). Mike Perry, 
another occupant of the truck, testified that he t0ld Officer 
Huish that he had not seen the gun before (Tr.87), and that he 
did not tell Officer Huish that the gun was in appellant's 
possession (Tr.100,101). Appellant testified that he knew 
nothing about the gun and that he so told Officer Huish on the 
day he was arrested (Tr.114,124,125). 
At the time of appellant's arrest for this offense, David 
McCoy was on felony probation; McCoy thought that a conviction, 
especially for possession of a firearm, would very likely cause 
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~ cevocation of his probation and would cause him to be sent 
to prison (Tr.52,53,54,55). 
At appellant's trial in this case, David McCoy testified 
that appellant had the gun in his possession (Tr.35,45). Mike 
Perry testified that, after all the occupants of the truck 
except appellant werB released, David McCoy made a statement to 
Perry regarding who had possession of the gun (Tr.90-98). The 
Court would not allow Perry to testify about the contents of 
McCoy's statement as it kept sustaining the prosecution's hearsay 
objection (Tr.90-98). It is clear, however, from a reading of 
that portion of the transcript that McCoy's prior statement, 
made at the scene of the arrest, was inconsistent with his 
testimony at trial. 
Also, at appellant's trial Officer Huish testified that 
"one reason" for his stopping the truck was that he observed 
an improper lane change; he never articulated any other reasons 
for the stop, if there were any (Tr.58,65). Officer Huish 
further testified that he never gave McCoy or a~yone a citation 
for the traffic violation (Tr.64,65), and McCoy confirmed 
that (Tr.51). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT 
INTO EVIDENCE A WITNESS' PRIOR INCON-
SISTENT STATEMENT REGARDING POSSESSION 
OF THE FIREARM. 
The trial in this case took place on April 25, 1983. As 
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the new Utah Rules of Evidence were not in effect until 
September 1, 1983, the applicable rule at the time of trial 
was Utah Rule of Evidence 63(1) (a), as contained in Utah Code 
Ann. (1953). That rule states: 
RULE 63 
HEARSAY EVIDENCE EXCLUDED--EXCEPTIONS 
Evidence of a statement which is made 
other than by a witness while testify-
ing at the hearing offered to prove the 
truth of the matter stated is hearsay 
evidence and inadmissible except: 
(1) Prior Statements of Witnesses. A 
prior statement of a witness, if the 
judge finds that the witness had an 
adequate opportunity to perceive the 
event or condition which his statement 
narrates, describes or explains, provid-
ed that (a) it is inconsistent with his 
present testimony. 
Witness David McCoy testified that appellant showed him 
the gun while they were in the truck, and that appellant had 
the gun tucked in the waistband of his pants. Later in the 
trial, Mike Perry, another occupant of the truck, testified as 
follows, in relevant part: 
A. . David McCoy crawled 
out of the police officer's car 
and came over and stood next to 
me. 
I kind of grabbed him by the elbow 
and pushed him to the side and 
said, "Hey, what is going on here?" 
You indicated to me that was not 
Dennis Heaps' gun." (Tr.90). 
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Q. Did you ask him whose gun it was? 
A. Yes, more or less indicated. Yes. 
(Tr. 91). 
Q. Did he say it was Mr. Heaps' gun? 
A. No, he did not. (Tr. 91). 
Q. Did he give you a name as to who 
the gun belonged to? 
A. He didn't have to. It was just me 
and him standing there. 
Q. And was that Mr. Heaps? 
A. No. (Tr. 97) 
Al though this testimony of Mike Perry's regarding McCoy's 
prior statements were reported in the transcript, they were all 
objected to as hearsay by the prosecution, and the objections were 
sustained by the trial court. Thus the trier of fact, in this 
case Judge Baldwin, could not consider those statements in 
reaching his verdict. In addition, Perry was never allowed to 
testify to the exact contents of McCoy's prior statement. None-
theless, it is clear from Perry's testimony that McCoy's prior 
statement did not agree with the testimony that McCoy had given 
earlier in the trial. 
The language of the applicable Utah Rule of Evidence 
63(a) (1) carves out an exception to the general hearsay rule. 
Although under this rule a prior inconsistent statement is 
hearsay (as opposed to the new rule on the same subject, Rule 
80l(d) (1) (A), which states that a prior inconsistent statement 
is not hearsay), it is an exception to the general rule that 
hearsay is not admissible. 
Most or all jurisdictions, including Utah, have rules allowing 
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the admission of a witness's prior inconsistent statement. 
E.g., United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982); 
United States v. Coran, 589 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1978); United 
States v. Plum, 558 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Champion International Corporation, 557 F. 2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1977); 
United States v. Morgan, 555 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1977); State v. 
Acree, 121 Ariz. 94, 588 P.2d 836 (1978). Although the juris-
dictions are not in agreement as to whether the prior statement 
can be admitted substantively or for impeachment only, Utah 
admits the statement substantively, both under the new and the 
old rules. As stated in the Committee Note to Rule 801 which 
follows the new Utah Rule of Evidence 801: 
Subdivision (d) (1) is similar to Rule 
63(1), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
It deviates from the federal Rule in 
that it allows use of prior statements 
as substantive evidence if (1) inconsis-
tent or (2) the witness has forgotten, 
and does not require the prior statement 
to have been given under oath or subject 
to perjury. The former Utah Rules 
admitted such statements as an exception 
to the hearsay rule. (Emphasis aclded). 
The policy behind such an exception (or exclusion from 
the definition of hearsay) is to protect a party from a "turn-
coat" witness, one who changes his story at trial. E.g.,~ 
States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282,284. The trier of fact could 
decide to believe the prior statement rather than the witness's 
testimony at trial. The rule also allows the trier of fact to u9 
the witness's inconsistency to help judge the witness's credibiL' 
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Thus based on the inconsistency, the trier of fact could decide 
that the witness is wholly or partially unworthy of belief. 
In the present case, the contents of McCoy's statement 
could well have caused a vital difference in appellant's case. 
If, as seems likely, McCoy had stated to Perry at the scene of 
appellant's arrest that appellant did not ever possess the gun 
and/or that the gun was actually in his (McCoy's) possession, 
the prior statement would have corroborated both appellant's 
testimony at trial and his statement to Officer Huish at the 
scene of the arrest. McCoy's prior statement would, no doubt, 
also have cast grave doubt on the veracity of McCoy's testimony 
at trial in which he stated that the appellant had possession of 
the gun while they were in the truck prior to the stopping of 
the truck. 
McCoy's prior inconsistent statements, therefore, should 
have been admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule, and it 
certainly cannot be deemed harmless error. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE GUN 
INTO EVIDENCE AS IT IS THE FRUIT OF 
APPELLANT'S ILLEGAL ARREST. 
When Officer Huish stopped the truck in which appellant 
was a passenger, he drew his gun and immediately required all 
the occupants to exit the truck. He then handcuffed all of them 
and kept them all restrained in that way while he searched the 
truck. During his search he found a gun under the bench seat of 
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the truck. Officer Huish testified that he did not tell the 
handcuffed persons that they were under arrest at this time, 
although he testified he told them they were subject to arrest 
The restraint of appellant, and the other occupants continued 
while Officer Huish questioned each one of them separately re-
garding the gun. He eventually released everyone but appellant 
who he took to jail and booked for Possession of a Dangerous 
Weapon by a Restricted Person. 
When questioned at trial about his reasons for stopping 
the truck, Officer Huish responded that a traffic violation he 
observed the driver of the truck, McCoy, commit was "one 
reason." However, he never said what reasons, other than McCoy' 
traffic violation, existed. 
A. THE STOP AND SEARCH WAS NOT A 
TERRY STOP AND SEARCH 
An arrest is generally defined as a deprivation of a 
person's liberty by legal authority. BLACK'S LAW DICTIO~ARY, 
140(rev. 4th ed. 1968). There is, of course, a distinction 
between an arrest and a Terry stop. The United States Supreme 
Court first established the legality of a stop which is less 
intrusive than an arrest in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
In that case, the Supreme Court held that a police officer 
can stop a person or a vehicle for a short period of time to 
make reasonable inquiries and to conduct a limited frisk of 
the person for weapons if the officer has observed unusual 
conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude that criminal 
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activity may be afoot. 
A Terry stop, therefore, is something much less severe 
than an arrest. Although a police officer may clearly detain 
~ person for a brief period of time to question the person, 
the detention must be of a minimal nature. As the United States 
Supreme Court recently said in explaining why an ordinary traffic 
stop is analagous to a Terry stop: 
Under the Fourth Amendment, we have 
held, a policeman who lacks probable 
cause but whose "observations lead 
him reasonably to suspect" that a 
particular person has committed, is 
committing, or is about to commit a 
crime, may detain that person briefly 
in order to "investigate the circumstances 
that provoke suspicion." Unted States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,881 (1975). 
"[T]he stop and inquiry must be "reason-
ably related in scope to the justificaion 
for their initiation." Ibid. (quoting 
Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 29.) Typically, 
this means that the officer may ask the 
detainee a moderate number of questions 
to determine his identity and to try to 
obtain information confirming or dispelling 
the officer's suspicions. But the detainee 
is not obliged to respond. And, unless the 
detainee's answers provide the officer with 
probable cause to arrest him, he must then 
be released. The comparatively nonthreaten-
ing character of detentions of this sort 
explains the absence of any suggestion in 
our opinion that Terry stops are subject 
to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly 
noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops 
prompts us to hold that persons temporarily 
detained pursuant to such stops are not "in 
custody" for the purposes of Miranda. 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 35 Criminal Law Reporter (CCH), 3192 (1984). 
In addition, although the officer may conduct a search for 
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weapons for his own safety, that search may not be extensive; 
it may only extend to a search of the outside of the person's 
clothing. Terry v. Ohio, supra; Pirri v. State, 428 So.2d 285 
(Fla. 1983). 
The distinction between a Terry stop and frisk situation 
and an arrest must be made on a case by case basis as there is 
no clear-cut factor which distinguishes one from the other. 
However, the United States Supreme Court has further clarified 
the distinction in several cases it decided after Terry. See 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Dunaway v. 
New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Florida v. Royer,~~ U.S.____] 
103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). 
In the Dunaway case, supra, police officers took the 
defendant into custody, upon less than probable cause, in 
connection with an attempted robbery and homicide; the defendant 
was taken to the police station and questioned. The defendant 
was never told he was under arrest, but officers admitted they 
would have physically restrained him had he tried to leave the 
station. The Court held that the police conduct in this case 
constituted an arrest of the defendant even if he was never so 
advised, and that it clearly exceeded the confines of a Terry 
stop. Since the police lacked probable cause to effect the 
arrest, the Court held the arrest illegal and the evidence 
obtained pursuant to the arrest inadmissible. 
The more recent United States Supreme Court case, ~' 
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v.~Royer, supra, further clarified the distinction between 
arrest and a Terry stop and frisk. In Royer, the suspicions of 
drug officers were aroused when they spotted the defendant 
wno fit the "drug courier profile" (the characteristics which 
apparently fit the profile were nervousness, a cash purchase 
of an airline ticket under an assumed name, heavy luggage, the 
25-35 year age and the casual dress of the defendant.) Upon 
the request of the officers, the defendant produced for them his 
airline ticket and driver's license. At this point, the officers 
identified themselves, told the defendant they suspected him of 
carrying drugs, and asked him to accompany them to a small 
room forty feet away. One officer, using the defendant's luggage 
claimcheck, retrieved his luggage and brought it back to the 
small room. When asked if he would consent to a search of the 
luggage, the defendant produced the luggage key which opened one 
suitecase and did not object when the officers forcibly opened 
the second. 
Based upon this set of facts, the Court ruled that, 
although the activities began as an investigative Terry-type 
detention, it became an arrest when the defendant was brought 
to the nearby room; as the officers lacked probable cause at 
that point, the arrest was illegal. Since the defendant's 
consent to the search was tainted by the illegal arrest, the 
search was also invalid and the evidence seized should have 
been suppressed by the trial court, the Supreme Court ruled. 
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In making this decision, the Royer court made it clear 
that the police may not carry out a full search of a person, 
car, or other effects as part of a Terry investigatory search, 
that a Terry search must be carefully tailored and limited, 
and that a Terry detention must be temporary and last no longer 
than necessary. 
Other courts dealing with this issue have also held 
that a person can be considered to be under arrest, rather than 
stopped for a Terry investigation, even without being brought 
to the police station for questioning. See People v. Hazelhurst. 
662 P.2d 1081 (Colo. 1983); United States v. Chamberlain, 644 F .. 
1262 (9th Cir. 1980). Whether or not a person is brought to 
the police station, therefore, is not the determining factor. 
As stated by the court in Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 
F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983): 
"Detention" defines a special category 
of Fourth Amendment seizures that are 
substantially less intrusive than arrests 
(citation omitted). Because detention 
represents only a limited intrusion, it 
can be justified by a reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity (citation omitted). 
However, that suspicion justifies only a 
brief stop and interrogation and, under 
proper circumstances, a brief check for 
weapons (citation omitted). If the 
seizure involves anything more than the 
brief and narrowly-defined intrusion 
authorized by Terry it must be justified 
by probable cause (citation omitted). 
Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 477. 
The use of the handcuffs and gun by Officer Huish on 
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appellant are certainly important factors to be considered in 
deciding whehter Huish's actions constituted an arrest or 
0 Terry stop. In Burns v. State, 595 P.2d 801 (Okla. 1979), the 
Cnurt ruled that a fact situation similar to the present case was 
an arrest, not a Terry stop. The Court commented, "This Court 
has previously upheld the legality of investigatory stops by 
police officers. .. However, investigatory stops are not 
made at gunpoint," (emphasis added). Burns, 595 P.2d at 803. 
In the present case, the officer's stop and subsequent 
search of the vehicle were both clearly far beyond the permissible 
scope allowed in a Terry stop and search. In this case, 
appellant and other occupants of the truck were o=dered out of 
the truck by the officer at gunpoint and were immediately hand-
cuffed. The officer kept appellant and the others detained in 
this manner while he searched the vehicle and then went back and 
forth between them questioning each indivually about the gun he 
found in the search. Such a detention cannot be considered a 
~erry stop since appellant's liberty was so severely restricted 
and the restriction was for a substantial period of time. 
The search of the vehicle, too, clearly exceeded the 
parameters of a Terry search in that the officer searched not 
only appellant's person but also searched the truck. 
A search that went beyond a pat-down of the outer cloth-
ing of a person detained for a valid Terry stop was held 
illegal for exceeding the scope of such an investigaroty detention 
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in Pirri v. State, 428 So.2d 285 (Fla. 1983). That Court 
said: "The police officer could only conduct a carefully 
limited, self-protective search of the outer clothin_s of such 
a person to discover the presence of weapons" (emphasis 
added), Pirri, 428 So.2d at 286. 
B. THE OFFICER'S CONDUCT HERE 
CONSTITUTED AN ARREST OF 
APPELLANT 
Officer Huish testified that none of the occupants of 
the vehicle were under arrest when he pointed his gun at them 
and handcuffed them all. However, courts which have dealt with 
the question of when an arrest occurs have made it clear that 
the words, "You are under arrest" are not "magic" words without 
which an arrest cannot occur. State v. Harrington, 430 So.2d 
394 (La. 1983); State v. Christian, 454 A. 2d 262, 189 Conn. 85 
(1983); McCrory v. State, 643 S.W. 2d 725 (1982). On the contn: 
the question of whether an arrest has occurred can only be 
determined by looking at all the circumstances surrounding the 
stop. The United States Supreme Court, in discussing whether 
a person stopped by an officer for a traffic violation was 
"in custody" for Miranda purposes even though the officer 
had already silently decided to arrest the person, said: 
Although Trooper Williams apparently 
decided as soon as respondent stepped 
out of his car that respondent would 
be taken into custody and charged with 
a traffic offense, Williams never com-
municated his intention to respondent. 
A policeman's unarticulared plan has 
no bearing on the question whether a 
suspect was "in custody" at a particular 
time; the only relevant inquiry is how 
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a reasonable man in the suspect's 
position would have understood his 
situation (emphasis added). 
ucrkcmer v. McCarty, 35 Criminal Law Reporter (CCH), 3192 (1984). 
The same inquiry is the proper one in deciding when an 
arrest has occurred. McQurter v. City of Atlanta, 572 F. Supp. 
1401 (N.D.Ga. 1983); State v. Waicelunas, 672 P.2d 968 (Ariz. 
1983); People v. Pancoast, 659 P.2d 1348 (Colo. 1982); Redarte 
v. City of Riverton, 552 P.2d 1245 (Wyo. 1976). An arrest can 
take place regardless of whether an officer tells the person 
that he is under arrest, State v. Christian, 189 Conn. 35, 454 
A.2d 262 (1983); State v. Harrington, 430 So.2d 394 (La. 1983); 
McCrory v. State, 643 S.W.2d 725 (1982), or whether the officer 
has even decided that he is going to arrest the person. People 
v. Pancoast, supra; State v. Waicelunas, supra. 
The subjective intent of the officer 
is not controlling on the issue whether 
an arrest has occurred; rather, the 
issue rests upon an evaluation of all 
the surrounding circumstances to deter-
mine whether a reasonable man innocent 
of any crime would have throught he was 
being arrested if he had been in 
defendant's shoes. 
State v. Waicelunas, 672 P.2d at 970. 
In this case, there can be very little question but that 
any reasonable person in appellant's position would have believed 
that he was under arrest when Officer Huish stopped the truck 
in which he was riding. The facts that support such a reasonable 
conclusion are that appellant was ordered out of the truck at 
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gunpoint, immediately handcuffed, and forced to remain in such 
a condition at the scene for quite some time while Officer 
Huish searched the truck and went back and forth among the 
various occupants of the truck to question each of them. 
certainly, any reasonable person faced with these facts would 
believe he was under arrest. 
C. APPELLANT'S ARREST WAS ILLEGAL 
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO PROBABLE 
CAUSE. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that an arrest can only be effected if there is probabl, 
cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the person 
arrested committed it. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 
(1959). Although a lesser standard than probable cause is 
required for a Terry stop, there are no exceptions to the probab 
cause requriement when an arrest, rather than a Terry stop, has 
taken place. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). 
The general def ini ti on of "probable cause" is; a reason-
able ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances suff icientl 
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious person in believing 
the accused to be guilty. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132 (1925). Mere suspicion is not enough to constitute probabl! 
cause. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). 
In addition, probable cause must be based on reasonably 
reliable information. The facts leading to a determination tha 
probable cause for an arrest exists must be of such a character 
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Lhat they would reasonably support a conclusion that probable 
r:ause exists. In other words, the officer making the arrest 
must have "reasonably trustworthy information." Draper v. 
united States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). Certainly probable cause 
must be more than a "gut feeling" or a suspicion. Henry v. 
United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). 
In the present case, appellant was arrested when he was 
ordered out of the truck and handcuffed; Officer Huish failed 
to articulate any reason for arresting appellant at that time. 
The only explanation he gave for any of his actions leading up 
to his finding of the gun in the truck was that an improper lane 
change was "one of the reasons" for his stop of the truck. His 
only articulated reason for suspicion, then, was the traffic 
violation he observed. As appellant was not driving the truck, 
he could not possibly be lawfully arrested for that. By imply-
ing that there were, perhaps, other reasons for the stop of the 
truck too does not satisfy the standard of probable cause. 
D. EVEN IF APPELLANT'S DETENTION WERE 
CHARACTERIZED AS A TERRY STOP, IT 
WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE THERE WAS NO 
REASONABLE SUSPICION TEA'l' CRII1INAL 
ACTIVITY WAS AFOOT. 
Appellant, as discussed in Point II, A, supra, contends 
that his detention on the day in question by far exceeded the 
limits on a Terry stop. However, even if the incident were 
rharacterized as a Terry stop, it must still be deemed unlawful 
because Officer Huish had no reasonable suspicion that criminal 
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activity was afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. l (1968). 
As discussed in Point II, C, supra, Officer Huish's 
only articulated reason for stopping the truck was the traffic 
violation corrunitted by David McCoy. Huish's statement that 
the traffic violation was "one of the reasons" for the stop 
does not rise even to the level required for a Terry stop. 
E. THE GUN FOln"D IN THE SEARCH OF 
THE TRUCK WAS THE POISONOUS FRUIT 
OF AN ILLEGAL SEi'\:RCII. l'IU.E ":,\, 
It is well settled that, generally, evidence found as a 
consequence of an illegal act on the part of a police officer 
must be suppressed. Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United 
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 
(1963); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). Such evidence 
may be admissible only if the knowledge or evidence is gained 
from a source independent from the illegal act, or if there has 
been such an attenuation between the original illegal act and 
the evidence that it cannot be considered a result of the ill~-
ality. Wong Sun v. United States, supra; United States v. 
Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978). 
In the present case, appellant was illegally arrested~ 
Officer Huish as it was never established that he had probable 
cause for appellant's arrest, see Point II, C, supra, nor was 
it a proper Terry stop, see Point II, A, supra. Therefore, tte 
search which Officer Huish conducted pursuant to this unlawful 
arrest was also illegal. 
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F. APPELLAllT HAS STANDING TO RAISE 
THIS ISSUE. 
Until 1978, the issue of whether one has standing to 
contest an illegal search was governed by Jones v. United States, 
362 U.S. 257 (1960); that case ruled that for a defendant to 
have standing to make a motion to suppress, he must have been 
a victim of a search or seizure. Jones also ruled that one who 
was legitimately present on the premises searched or in the 
vehicle searched had standing to make the motion to suppress. 
In 1978, however, the Supreme Court decided the case of 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), reh. den. 439 U.S. 1122. 
The Rakas decision changed significantly the law of standing to 
raise the issue of an illegal search .. Rakas, however, did not 
completely overrule Jones, but rather altered the standard from 
the Jones inquiry into whether a person was legitimately on the 
premises searched to an inquiry of whether that person had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched. 
The Rakas decision, however, does not mandate that a 
passenger without a property interest in either the vehicle 
or the property seized be always denied standing to make a 
motion to suppress. There are still some circumstances in which 
a passenger has standing to make such a motion, despite Rakas. 
As stated in 3 Lafave, Search and Seizure, §11.3 (1984, Pocket 
Part), at 233: 
Does this mean that persons who are 
"merely passengers" (i.e., asserting 
neither a property nor a possessory 
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interest in the vehicle, nor an interest 
in the property seized) will never have 
standing? Although Justice Rehnquist's 
opinion unfortunately does not even hint 
at a stopping point short of such an 
absolute rule, thus prompting some courts 
to give Rakas such an interpretation, it 
does not-seeffi that Rakas goes this far. 
For one thing, it is important to note, as 
the concurring opinion in Rakas takes great 
pains to emphasize, that the "petitioners 
do not challenge the constitutionality of 
the police action in stopping the automo-
bile in which they were riding; nor do 
they complain of being made to get out of 
the vehicle," so that the question before 
the Court was "a narrow one: Did the search 
of their friend's automobile after they had 
left it violate any Fourth Amendment right 
of the petitioners?" This would indicate, 
as two-thirds of the Court (the two con-
curring justices and the four dissenters) 
recognizes that a passenger does have 
standing to object to police conduct which 
intrudes upon his Fourth Amendment protec-
tion against unreasonable seizure of his 
person. If either the stopping of the car 
or the passenger's removal from it are 
unreasonable in a Fourth Amendment sense, 
then surely the passenger has standing to 
object to those constitutional violations 
and to have suppressed any evidence found 
in the car which is their fruit. 
This reasoning has, in fact, been followed by some coul": 
who have dealt with this issue since the Rakas decision came 
down. E.g., People v. Kunath, 99 Ill.App.3d 201, 425 N.E. 2d 
486 (1981). 
Regardless of whether defendant had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the contents of the automobile so as to 
challenge successfully the search thereof, 
as a passenger he can challenge the stopping 
of the vehicle since his personal liberty 
and freedom were intruded upon by that act 
(citation omitted). The Fourth and Fourteenth 
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Amendments of the United States 
Constitution forbids unreasonable searches 
and seizures (emphasis in original) , 
and it is clear that stopping an auto-
mobile and detaining its occupants 
constitutes a "seizure" of those persons 
(citation omitted). And, for the evidence 
seized as a result of that stop to be 
admissible, the stop must not have been 
unreasonable. 
People v. Kunath, 425 N.E. 2d at 489. 
Although appellant here is contesting the legality of 
his arrest, rather than the stopping of the automobile, the same 
reasoning as is stated by the Kunath Court, above, applies. 
In the case at bar, appellant is not prevented by the 
Rakas decision from asserting that the search of the truck in 
which he was riding was illegal. The reason that appellant 
may assert this issue despite Rakas is that he is contesting 
the search as being the fruit of an illegal arrest. See Point 
II,A,B,C and D, supra. As Rakas did not deal with such a 
situation and is, therefore, distinguishable and since dicta 
in Rakas, in fact, seems to preserve the right of a person to 
contest a search which is the fruit of an illegal arrest, 
appellant here has standing to raise this issue. 
G. THE PROSECUTION HAD THE BURDEN OF 
ESTABLISHING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 
THE ARREST. 
The general rule governing searches is that a warrant 
is required. There are exceptions to that rule, however; thus, 
in certain well-defined instances, warrantless searches are 
proper. 
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In this case, Officer Huish's search of the truck in 
which appellant was riding at the time of his arrest was 
warrantless. Since appellant's arrest was illegal, then the 
search was also illegal. See Point II,A-D, supra. 
Respondent may argue that there was, in fact, probable 
cause for the search but that Officer Huish simply failed to 
describe the basis for the probable cause at trial. The resol~ 
tion of such an issue is dependent on whose burden it is to pro 
that the arrest was either justified by probable cause or that 
no probable cause existed to justify the arrest. 
In cases where warrantless searches are conducted, the 
burden should be on the prosecution to prove that an exception 
to the warrant requirement exists. 
With respect to the issue which is 
usually central in a motion to suppress 
hearing--the reasonableness of the 
challenged search or seizure--most 
states follow the rule which is utilized 
in the federal courts: if the search or 
seizure was pursuant to a warrant, the 
defendant has the burden of proof, but 
if the poljce acted without a warrant 
the burden of proof is on the prosecution. 
The warrant--no warrant dichotomy is 
typically explained on the ground that 
when the police have acted with a warrant 
"an independent determination on the issue 
of probable cause has already been made by 
a magistrate, thereby giving rise to a 
presumption of legality," while when they 
have acted without a warrant "the evidence 
comprising probable cause is particularly 
within the knowledge and control of the 
arresting agencies." [Malcom v. U.S., 332 
A.2d 917 (D.C.App. 1975)] Morever, it is 
said that "(w]ithout such a rule there 
would be little reason for law enforcement 
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agencies to bother with the formality 
of a warrant (Id.). 
1 LaFave, Search and Seizure, §11.2, Vol. 3, p. 500 (1978). 
Not all jurisdictions follow this rule, however; some 
courts uniformly place the burden of proof on the prosecution 
for the reason that the state is the party which seeks to use 
the evidence and thus should be required to prove that it was 
obtained lawfully. See State v. Heald, 314 A.2d 820 (Ore. 1973); 
Canning v. State, 226 So. 2d 747 (Miss. 1969). Other jurisdictions 
place the burden uniformly on the defendant, see People v. Ikerd, 
26 Ill. 2d 573, 188 N.E. 2d 12 (1963); State v. Holt, 415 S.W. 2d 
761 (Mo. 1967), for reasons such as that the burden should be on 
the moving party, there is a presumption of regularity regarding 
the actions of law enforcement agencies, evidence is considered 
admissible and exceptions to admissibility should be justified 
by the one claiming the exception, and that such a practice will 
deter frivolous claims. 
at 500: 
As stated in 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure, §11.2 (1978) 
Placing the burden upon the defendant 
even in the no warrant situation would 
seem to place him in a most disadvanta-
geous position. As one commentator has 
noted, "it would be impossible for a 
defendant to prove a lack of probable 
cause in the abstract," for he "cannot 
be expected to prove a lack of some 
item until he knows on what the govern-
ment bases its claim of its existence." 
[Citing Symposium, 25 Ohio St.L.J. 501, 
528 (1964); l 
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One of the most important policy concerns which must 
be considered when the burden of proof is allocated on this 
issue is which party has greater access to the relevant facts. 
It is certainly more efficient to, thus, require the prosecut1 
to carry the burden of proving that the police validly proceede. 
without a warrant, for the officer(s) involved in the search 
know the facts that might establish such an exception. To 
put the burden on the defendant would only result in "fishing 
expeditions" by the defense since it would be trying to negate 
the legality of all the possible valid grounds for the warrant-
less search without having the kind of access to the police 
officers that the prosection has. See Commonwealth v. 
Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 315 N.E.2d 530 (1974). 
It was, therefore, up to the prosecution to require 
Officer Huish to articulate any proable cause he may have had 
to arrest appellant. At no time did Officer Huish state any 
probable cause, if any existed, for the arrest of appellant. 
As the burden was on the prosecution to produce any such evider.•:· 
and it failed to do so, it cannot now argue that there was 
probable cause for the arrest after all. 
H. THIS ISSUE IS PRESERVED BY DEFENSE 
COUNSEL'S OBJECTION. 
At the time the prosecution moved for the admission into 
evidence of the gun found in the search, defense counsel made 
an objection. 
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Mr. Valdez: I would object at this 
time, Your Honor. I don't think 
there's any probable cause on which 
to pull the vehicle over. Certainly 
no probable cause to make an extended 
search of the vehicle. I would object 
to that (the gun) as being introduced 
into evidence at this time. (Tr.73). 
The Court denied the objection and received the gun 
into evidence. The issue of the validity of the search was 
clearly preserved by the above-quoted objection by defense 
counsel. At the very least, when defense counsel objected the 
Court should have required the prosecution to inquire further 
into Officer Huish's reasons for stopping the truck and arrest-
ing appellant. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUSTAIN A FINDING OF GUILTY. 
Appellant was found guilty of Possession of a Dangerous 
Weapon by a Restricted Person. Although several witnesses 
testified at appellant's trial, only one witness, David McCoy, 
testified that appellant had possession of the gun in question. 
As having possession is one of the essential elements of the 
offense in question, it is necessary that sufficient evidence 
exist to establish the fact that appellant did, in fact, possess 
the gun. 
The standard for reversal of a conviction for insufficiency 
of the evidence is whether, after reveiwing all the evidence 
and drawing all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from 
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it in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence 
"is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable (so 
that) reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable dout_ 
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convict, 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983). 
Since David McCoy was the only witness who testified 
that the gun was in appellant's possession, his testimony must 
be examined carefully. If McCoy's testimony does not establi~ 
the element of possession, then the evidence cannot be said 
to be sufficient to uphold the verdict in this case. 
Several courts have examined the evidence to determine 
its sufficiency when a conviction is based on the testimony of 
one witness whose credibility is drawn into question because oi 
the witness's bias or lack of truthfulness. Those courts have 
ruled that such testimony must be looked at very carefully so 
that a defendant will not be unfairly convicted by evidence 
given by a witness who is not credible. 
In Gaddis v. St:ite, 251 N.E.2d 658 (Ind. 1969), the 
defendant's robbery conviction was based upon the testimony 
of one witness. That witness admitted that he had been told 
he would go to prison if he did not testify against the defenda~ 
Also the witness's testimony kept changing regarding how posit0 
he was in identifying the defendant. In reversing defendant's 
conviction for insufficient evidence, the court stated: 
This court must be particularly vigilant 
where a conviction is supported by the 
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testimony of one eyewitness. Testimonial 
errors resulting from imperfect recollection, 
defective perception or suggestion have 
been shown to occur and we would be careful 
not to implement a miscarriage of justice 
in such a situation where that testimony 
is the only testimony of appellant's guilt. 
Where the evidence merely tends to support 
a conclusion of guilt it is not enough; 
it must support such a conclusion beyond 
a reasonable doubt (citation omitted). 
To hold otherwise would violate the pre-
sumption of innocence until guilt is 
proven. 
Gaddis v. State, 251 N.E.2d at 662. 
The court in People v. Williams, 357 N.E.2d 525 (Ill. 1976), 
reversed the defendant's murder conviction becuase the testimony 
of the two supposed eyewitnesses, Jones and Robinson, were both 
tainted by their own interests. Robinson had never mentioned 
any involvement by the defendant in the crime until he was 
informed that he was going to be charged with the crime. Jones 
also had an interest in that he was promised by the State that 
he would be released from prison if he testified against the 
defendant. In addition, the testimony of Robinson at trial 
was inconsistent in many instances from his testimony at prior 
hearings. In explaining its reasoning for reversing the 
conviction, the Court stated: 
Robinson agreed to make a statement only 
after the police informed him that he 
would be charged with the murder of the 
cab driver. Robinson was an interested 
person, therefore, who did have a motive 
to implicate the defendant in the murder. 
considering this fact, together with the 
inconsistent testimony given by Robinson, 
we find that Robinson's testimony was 
entitled to little weight. 
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The State relied primarily upon the 
testimony of Larry Jones to corrobor-
ate Robinson. Jones' credibility was 
severely limited, however, by the 
revelation that he had agreed to 
testify only after bein'J promised by 
the State that his immediate release 
from prison would be arranged. Jones, 
who had served a little over two years 
of a 15-to-30-year prison sentence, had 
much to gain by testifying for the State. 
While that fact alone did not necessarily 
destroy Jones' credibility, we have held 
that when it appears that a witness has 
hopes of a reward from the prosecution, 
his testimony should not be accepted 
unless it carries with it an absolute 
conviction of its truth. 
People v. Williams, 357 N.E.2d at 529-30. 
The facts of the present case are very similar to the fac 
of Gaddis v. State, supra, and People v. Williams, supra, in 
regard to the testimony against appellant by David McCoy. The 
gun which appellant was accused of possessing was found in the 
truck owned and being driven by McCoy. McCoy had a very 
definite interest in not being thought by Officer Huish to haw 
possessed the gun himself since he was on felony probation 
at the time. 
McCoy indicated that while testifying, that his probation 
would likely be revoked and he would go to prison if he were 
to be convicted of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a 
Restricted Person. McCoy, then, was most certainly an interest; 
witness, one who had a great deal to gain if someone riding 
in his truck on the day in question,other than himself, were 
found to be in possession of the gun Officer Huish found. Mccc: 
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1 nterest is closely analagous to the interest of the witnesses 
in the Gaddis and Williams cases, supra, where the witnesses 
were all interested in not being themselves charged with a crime 
or in getting out of prison. 
In both Gaddis and Williams, supra, the testimony of 
the witnesses contained inconsistencies whichfurtherbrought 
their testimony into question. McCoy's testimony, too, was 
inconsistent with his prior statement to Mike Perry at the 
time appellant was arrested. McCoy apparently told Mike Perry 
something about the possession of the gun which differed greatly 
from his testimony at trial, although we do not know precisely 
what his statement was because the court would not allow Perry 
to testify about the contents of McCoy's statement. See Point 
I, supra. 
Given these serious weaknesses in McCoy's testimony, 
his clear interest in seeing that appellant was convicted, and 
the inconsistency between his trial testimony and his prior 
statement to Perry regarding the essence of this offense, 
i.e., whether appellant had possession of the gun, his testi-
mony can be given little or no weight. As McCoy was the only 
witness who placed the gun in appellant's possession, the 
prosecution did not me.et its burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
-29-
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons that are discussed above, appellant 
respectfully requests that the Court reverse the conviciton 
and judgment entered against him in the Court below. 
DATED this ~day of September, 1984. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LISA J. MAL 
Attorney for Appellant 
DELIVERED two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant 
to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this day of September, 1984. 
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